Monday, 18 January 2021

Why fake news is here to stay

Despite Donald Trump’s impending departure from the White House, “fake news,” as both a slogan and a phenomenon, is here to stay.

When it comes to fake news, human beings have been particularly addicted to the narratives of character assassination from time immemorial. The future of reputation assaults will be the distant past — the informational viruses of inquisitions and witch hunts that tap into pre-existing fears that spread without intervention from referees.

Indeed, character assassination is the weapon of our age; the only things that have changed since the times of our barbaric ancestors are the technologies of attack and the false belief that we’re more advanced than they were.

To understand why fake news is here to stay we first have to look at what the term means and differentiate it from biased news. “Fake news” consists of factually fabricated stories spread mostly on social media. Biased news is corrupted by the ideological agendas of the news outlet and has been the cornerstone of the mainstream American media for decades. News can be biased both in its content and in what the outlet chooses to cover and not to cover.

Mr. Trump deliberately conflates biased news or news he does not like with “fake news,” which is not the same thing.

Fake news, especially information designed to damage a target, will remain for a few reasons. First, there is a bottomless market for it.

Billions of people are actively seeking to have their worldviews validated, especially if it involves confirmation that we are victims of an adversarial elite that is standing in the way of our dreams or sense of justice. If one of these elites can be sacrificed in the manner of the proverbial virgin tossed into the volcano, we’re all in. Lying or spreading false information in the new climate is a perverse act proving that the trafficker has grit and tribal affinity.

Comic actor Rowan Atkinson recently said, “The problem we have online is that an algorithm decides what we want to see, which ends up creating a simplistic, binary view of society. It becomes a case of either you’re with us or against us. And if you’re against us, you deserve to be ‘canceled.’”

Another reason why character assassination using dubious data is here to stay is that it has never been easier to do. Aiding in the unfettered spread of politically-motivated fake news is its overseas origins, beyond the reach of U.S. law enforcement. In colonial America and medieval Europe, character assassination took the form of verbal gossip — alleging, during times of great anxiety, that an unlovable person was possessed by demons. Today, we have Twitter.

For much of the 20th century, the media were deeply biased but there were referees. If someone wanted to level an allegation, most journalists — even biased ones — felt an obligation to vet the charge or assess its merits before publishing it. The Internet has wiped out the referees.

Lifestyle self-promoter Hilaria Baldwin (wife of actor Alec) was recently exposed as a well-to-do American White woman as opposed to the Spanish continental of her fierce marketing. All it took was an anonymous tweet from someone who didn’t dig her act based on some superficial research. The close cousin of character assassination is, after all, character suicide.

In our age, all sins are essentially equal. Harvey Weinstein is rightly ruined for being a habitual sexual predator while Sen. Al Franken loses his Senate seat for being photographed making a crude gesture during his days as a comedian. Woe to anyone who suggests there is a spectrum of wrongdoing.

John Kerry, like all politicians is a self-promoter, but he lost the presidency in large measure because his honorable military service in Vietnam was attacked by detractors in the searing Swift Boat Veterans for Truth campaign.

Where one stands on an attack or a person or institution depends upon pre-existing biases. Nevertheless, penetrating attacks with fraudulent elements include charges that: Bill Gates created the coronavirus in order to profit from it; Donald Trump is actively controlled by the Kremlin; Dr. Anthony Fauci led the way in downplaying COVID-19; Justice Amy Coney Barrett is fully indoctrinated in a cult where women must obey their husbands and provide sex on demand.

Despite the colossal lies that wrongly convicted the Duke lacrosse players in the court of public opinion of rape, there is also enough recorded footage of genuine injustice as in the death of George Floyd that it makes the less provable ones plausible.

Issues of the day all have character assassination element — #MeToo, Black Lives Matter, climate change. A woman who has been assaulted will be the recipient of demeaning rumors if she comes forward, the accused will have his reputation and job prospects shattered. With Black Lives Matter, profiling is an act of character assassination as is being accused of being a “Karen,” a White woman acting out her latent racism through accusatory behavior. Climate change quickly degenerates into ad hominem attacks on scientists and their motives.

And now we have the rise of “deep fakes,” the manipulation of video and audio technology that can make fake words come out of a real person’s mouth, which happened when former President Obama allegedly cursed about his successor and Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg admitted his objective was to manipulate users for profit. Both of these examples were deep fakes.

Whether you call it fake news, biased news or character assassination, there is no current antidote. The only hope that I can see is intense awareness all along the ideological spectrum.

Comedian Ricky Gervais recently spoke about the hazards of being misunderstood in our digital Dodge City: “The scary thing is being canceled if you say the wrong thing and suddenly Netflix can take you off their platform. You could be the most woke, politically correct stand-up in the world at the moment, but you don’t know what it’s going to be like in 10 years’ time. You can get canceled for things you said 10 years ago.”

Tuesday, 12 January 2021

سد الذرائع

سد الذرائع، من الأدلة المختلف فيها.

قال ابن تيمية -رحمه الله-: «وَالذَّرِيعَةُ مَا كَانَ وَسِيلَةً وَطَرِيقًا إلَى الشَّيْءِ، لَكِنْ صَارَتْ فِي عُرْفِ الْفُقَهَاءِ عِبَارَةً عَمَّا أَفَضْت إلَى فِعْلٍ مُحَرَّمٍ. وَلَوْ تَجَرَّدَتْ عَنْ ذَلِكَ الْإِفْضَاءِ لَمْ يَكُنْ فِيهَا مَفْسَدَةٌ، وَلِهَذَا قِيلَ: الذَّرِيعَةُ الْفِعْلُ الَّذِي ظَاهِرُهُ أَنَّهُ مُبَاحٌ وَهُوَ وَسِيلَةٌ إلَى فِعْلِ الْمُحَرَّمِ. أَمَّا إذَا أَفْضَتْ إلَى فَسَادٍ لَيْسَ هُوَ فِعْلًا كَإِفْضَاءِ شُرْبِ الْخَمْرِ إلَى السُّكْرِ، وَإِفْضَاءِ الزِّنَا إلَى اخْتِلَاطِ الْمِيَاهِ، أَوْ كَانَ الشَّيْءُ نَفْسُهُ فَسَادًا كَالْقَتْلِ وَالظُّلْمِ، فَهَذَا لَيْسَ مِنْ هَذَا الْبَابِ، فَإِنَّا نَعْلَمُ إنَّمَا حُرِّمَتْ الْأَشْيَاءُ لِكَوْنِهَا فِي نَفْسِهَا فَسَادًا بِحَيْثُ تَكُونُ ضَرَرًا لَا مَنْفَعَةَ فِيهِ، أَوْ لِكَوْنِهَا مُفْضِيَةً إلَى فَسَادٍ، بِحَيْثُ تَكُونُ هِيَ فِي نَفْسِهَا فِيهَا مَنْفَعَةٌ، وَهِيَ مُفْضِيَةٌ إلَى ضَرَرٍ أَكْثَرَ مِنْهَا؛ فَتَحْرُمُ، فَإِنْ كَانَ ذَلِكَ الْفَسَادُ فِعْلَ مَحْظُورٍ سُمِّيَتْ ذَرِيعَةً، وَإِلَّا سُمِّيَتْ سَبَبًا وَمُقْتَضِيًا، وَنَحْوَ ذَلِكَ مِنْ الْأَسْمَاءِ الْمَشْهُورَةِ.

ثُمَّ هَذِهِ الذَّرَائِعُ إذَا كَانَتْ تُفْضِي إلَى الْمُحَرَّمِ غَالِبًا فَإِنَّهُ يُحَرِّمُهَا مُطْلَقًا.

وَكَذَلِكَ إنْ كَانَتْ قَدْ تُفْضِي، وَقَدْ لَا تُفْضِي، لَكِنَّ الطَّبْعَ مُتَقَاضٍ لِإِفْضَائِهَا.

وَأَمَّا إنْ كَانَتْ إنَّمَا تُفْضِي أَحْيَانًا: فَإِنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ فِيهَا مَصْلَحَةٌ رَاجِحَةٌ عَلَى هَذَا الْإِفْضَاءِ الْقَلِيلِ، وَإِلَّا حَرَّمَهَا أَيْضًا.

ثُمَّ هَذِهِ الذَّرَائِعُ مِنْهَا مَا يُفْضِي إلَى الْمَكْرُوهِ بِدُونِ قَصْدِ فَاعِلِهَا.

وَمِنْهَا مَا تَكُونُ إبَاحَتُهَا مُفْضِيَةً لِلتَّوَسُّلِ بِهَا إلَى الْمَحَارِمِ . ... ...

وَالْغَرَضُ هُنَا أَنَّ الذَّرَائِعَ حَرَّمَهَا الشَّارِعُ، وَإِنْ لَمْ يَقْصِدْ بِهَا الْمُحَرَّمَ خَشْيَةَ إفْضَائِهَا إلَى الْمُحَرَّمِ، فَإِذَا قَصَدَ بِالشَّيْءِ نَفْسَ الْمُحَرَّمِ كَانَ أَوْلَى بِالتَّحْرِيمِ مِنْ الذَّرَائِعِ
.
وَبِهَذَا التَّحْرِيرِ يَظْهَرُ عِلَّةُ التَّحْرِيمِ فِي مَسَائِلِ الْعِينَةِ وَأَمْثَالِهَا وَإِنْ لَمْ يَقْصِدْ الْبَائِعُ الرِّبَا؛ لِأَنَّ هَذِهِ الْمُعَامَلَةَ يَغْلِبُ فِيهَا قَصْدُ الرِّبَا؛ فَيَصِيرُ ذَرِيعَةً، فَيَسُدُّ هَذَا الْبَابَ؛ لِئَلَّا يَتَّخِذَهُ النَّاسُ ذَرِيعَةً إلَى الرِّبَا، وَيَقُولُ الْقَائِلُ: لَمْ أَقْصِدْ بِهِ ذَلِكَ، وَلِئَلَّا يَدْعُو الْإِنْسَانُ فِعْلَهُ مَرَّةً إلَى أَنْ يَقْصِدَ مَرَّةً أُخْرَى، وَلِئَلَّا يَعْتَقِدَ أَنَّ جِنْسَ هَذِهِ الْمُعَامَلَةِ حَلَالٌ وَلَا يُمَيِّزَ بَيْنَ الْقَصْدِ وَعَدَمِهِ، وَلِئَلَّا يَفْعَلَهَا الْإِنْسَانُ مَعَ قَصْدٍ خَفِيٍّ يَخْفَى مِنْ نَفْسِهِ عَلَى نَفْسِهِ.

وَلِلشَّرِيعَةِ أَسْرَارٌ فِي سَدِّ الْفَسَادِ وَحَسْمِ مَادَّةِ الشَّرِّ، لِعِلْمِ الشَّارِعِ مَا جُبِلتْ عَلَيْهِ النُّفُوسُ، وَبِمَا يَخْفَى عَلَى النَّاسِ مِنْ خَفِيِّ هُدَاهَا الَّذِي لَا يَزَالُ يَسْرِي فِيهَا حَتَّى يَقُودَهَا إلَى الْهَلَكَةِ؛

فَمَنْ تَحَذْلَقَ عَلَى الشَّارِعِ وَاعْتَقَدَ فِي بَعْضِ الْمُحَرَّمَاتِ أَنَّهُ إنَّمَا حُرِّمَ لِعِلَّةِ كَذَا، وَتِلْكَ الْعِلَّةُ مَقْصُودَةٌ فِيهِ، فَاسْتَبَاحَهُ بِهَذَا التَّأْوِيلِ؛ فَهُوَ ظَلُومٌ لِنَفْسِهِ، جَهُولٌ بِأَمْرِ رَبِّهِ، وَهُوَ إنْ نَجَا مِنْ الْكُفْرِ، لَمْ يَنْجُ غَالِبًا مِنْ بِدْعَةٍ، أَوْ فِسْقٍ، أَوْ قِلَّةِ فِقْهٍ فِي الدِّينِ، وَعَدَمِ بَصِيرَةٍ»اهـ(الفتاوى الكبرى لابن تيمية 6/ 172- 174) باختصار).

قال ابن قيم الجوزية -رحمه الله- (إعلام الموقعين 3/159): «باب سد الذرائع أحد أرباع التكليف؛ فإنه أمر ونهي.

والأمر نوعان:

أحدهما: مقصود لنفسه.

والثاني: وسيلة إلى المقصود.

والنهي نوعان:

أحدهما: ما يكون المنهى عنه مفسدة في نفسه.

والثاني: ما يكون وسيلة إلى المفسدة؛

فصار سد الذرائع المفضية إلى الحرام أحد أرباع الدين»اهـ.

وقال: «لَمَّا كَانَتْ الْمَقَاصِدُ لَا يُتَوَصَّلُ إلَيْهَا إلَّا بِأَسْبَابٍ وَطُرُقٍ تُفْضِي إلَيْهَا كَانَتْ طُرُقُهَا وَأَسْبَابُهَا تَابِعَةً لَهَا مُعْتَبَرَةً بِهَا؛
فَوَسَائِلُ الْمُحَرَّمَاتِ وَالْمَعَاصِي فِي كَرَاهَتِهَا وَالْمَنْعِ مِنْهَا بِحَسَبِ إفْضَائِهَا إلَى غَايَاتِهَا وَارْتِبَاطَاتِهَا بِهَا.
وَوَسَائِلُ الطَّاعَاتِ وَالْقُرُبَاتِ فِي مَحَبَّتِهَا وَالْإِذْنِ فِيهَا بِحَسَبِ إفْضَائِهَا إلَى غَايَتِهَا؛
فَوَسِيلَةُ الْمَقْصُودِ تَابِعَةٌ لِلْمَقْصُودِ، وَكِلَاهُمَا مَقْصُودٌ، لَكِنَّهُ مَقْصُودٌ قَصْدَ الْغَايَاتِ وَهِيَ مَقْصُودَةٌ قَصْدَ الْوَسَائِلِ؛
فَإِذَا حَرَّمَ الرَّبُّ تَعَالَى شَيْئًا وَلَهُ طُرُقٌ وَوَسَائِلُ تُفْضِي إلَيْهِ فَإِنَّهُ يُحَرِّمُهَا وَيَمْنَعُ مِنْهَا؛ تَحْقِيقًا لِتَحْرِيمِهِ، وَتَثْبِيتًا لَهُ، وَمَنْعًا أَنْ يُقْرَبَ حِمَاهُ، وَلَوْ أَبَاحَ الْوَسَائِلَ وَالذَّرَائِعَ الْمُفْضِيَةَ إلَيْهِ لَكَانَ ذَلِكَ نَقْضًا لِلتَّحْرِيمِ، وَإِغْرَاءً لِلنُّفُوسِ بِهِ، وَحِكْمَتُهُ تَعَالَى وَعِلْمُهُ يَأْبَى ذَلِكَ كُلَّ الْإِبَاءِ. بَلْ سِيَاسَةُ مُلُوكِ الدُّنْيَا تَأْبَى ذَلِكَ؛ فَإِنَّ أَحَدَهُمْ إذَا مَنَعَ جُنْدَهُ أَوْ رَعِيَّتَهُ أَوْ أَهْلَ بَيْتِهِ مِنْ شَيْءٍ ثُمَّ أَبَاحَ لَهُمْ الطُّرُقَ وَالْأَسْبَابَ وَالذَّرَائِعَ الْمُوَصِّلَةَ إلَيْهِ لَعُدَّ مُتَنَاقِضًا، وَلَحَصَلَ مِنْ رَعِيَّتِهِ وَجُنْدِهِ ضِدُّ مَقْصُودِهِ.

وَكَذَلِكَ الْأَطِبَّاءُ إذَا أَرَادُوا حَسْمَ الدَّاءِ مَنَعُوا صَاحِبَهُ مِنْ الطُّرُقِ وَالذَّرَائِعِ الْمُوَصِّلَةِ إلَيْهِ، وَإِلَّا فَسَدَ عَلَيْهِمْ مَا يَرُومُونَ إصْلَاحَهُ.
فَمَا الظَّنُّ بِهَذِهِ الشَّرِيعَةِ الْكَامِلَةِ الَّتِي هِيَ فِي أَعْلَى دَرَجَاتِ الْحِكْمَةِ وَالْمَصْلَحَةِ وَالْكَمَالِ؟

وَمَنْ تَأَمَّلَ مَصَادِرَهَا وَمَوَارِدَهَا؛ عَلِمَ أَنَّ اللَّهَ تَعَالَى وَرَسُولَهُ سَدَّ الذَّرَائِعَ الْمُفْضِيَةَ إلَى الْمَحَارِمِ بِأَنْ حَرَّمَهَا وَنَهَى عَنْهَا.
وَالذَّرِيعَةُ: مَا كَانَ وَسِيلَةً وَطَرِيقًا إلَى الشَّيْءِ.

وَلَا بُدَّ مِنْ تَحْرِيرِ هَذَا الْمَوْضِعِ قَبْلَ تَقْرِيرِهِ؛ لِيَزُولَ الِالْتِبَاسُ فِيهِ، فَنَقُولُ:

الْفِعْلُ أَوْ الْقَوْلُ الْمُفْضِي إلَى الْمَفْسَدَةِ قِسْمَانِ:

أَحَدُهُمَا: أَنْ يَكُونَ وَضْعُهُ لِلْإِفْضَاءِ إلَيْهَا، كَشُرْبِ الْمُسْكِرِ الْمُفْضِي إلَى مَفْسَدَةِ السُّكْرِ، وَكَالْقُذُفِ الْمُفْضِي إلَى مَفْسَدَةِ الْفِرْيَةِ، وَالزِّنَا الْمُفْضِي إلَى اخْتِلَاطِ الْمِيَاهِ وَفَسَادِ الْفِرَاشِ، وَنَحْوِ ذَلِكَ؛ فَهَذِهِ أَفْعَالٌ وَأَقْوَالٌ وُضِعَتْ مُفْضِيَةً لِهَذِهِ الْمَفَاسِدِ وَلَيْسَ لَهَا ظَاهِرٌ غَيْرُهَا.

وَالثَّانِي: أَنْ تَكُونَ مَوْضُوعَةً لِلْإِفْضَاءِ إلَى أَمْرٍ جَائِزٍ أَوْ مُسْتَحَبٍّ، فَيُتَّخَذَ وَسِيلَةً إلَى الْمُحَرَّمِ إمَّا بِقَصْدِهِ أَوْ بِغَيْرِ قَصْدٍ مِنْهُ؛
فَالْأَوَّلُ كَمَنْ يَعْقِدُ النِّكَاحَ قَاصِدًا بِهِ التَّحْلِيلَ، أَوْ يَعْقِدُ الْبَيْعَ قَاصِدًا بِهِ الرِّبَا، أَوْ يُخَالِعُ قَاصِدًا بِهِ الْحِنْثَ، وَنَحْوِ ذَلِكَ.

وَالثَّانِي كَمَنْ يُصَلِّي تَطَوُّعًا بِغَيْرِ سَبَبٍ فِي أَوْقَاتِ النَّهْيِ، أَوْ يَسُبُّ أَرْبَابَ الْمُشْرِكِينَ بَيْنَ أَظْهُرِهِمْ، أَوْ يُصَلِّي بَيْنَ يَدَيْ الْقَبْرِ لِلَّهِ، وَنَحْوِ ذَلِكَ.
ثُمَّ هَذَا الْقِسْمُ مِنْ الذَّرَائِعِ نَوْعَانِ:

أَحَدُهُمَا: أَنْ تَكُونَ مَصْلَحَةُ الْفِعْلِ أَرْجَحَ مِنْ مَفْسَدَتِهِ.

وَالثَّانِي: أَنْ تَكُونَ مَفْسَدَتُهُ رَاجِحَةً عَلَى مَصْلَحَتِهِ.

فَهَاهُنَا أَرْبَعَةُ أَقْسَامٍ:

الْأَوَّلُ: وَسِيلَةٌ مَوْضُوعَةٌ لِلْإِفْضَاءِ إلَى الْمَفْسَدَةِ.

الثَّانِي: وَسِيلَةٌ مَوْضُوعَةٌ لِلْمُبَاحِ قُصِدَ بِهَا التَّوَسُّلُ إلَى الْمَفْسَدَةِ.

الثَّالِثُ: وَسِيلَةٌ مَوْضُوعَةٌ لِلْمُبَاحِ لَمْ يُقْصَدْ بِهَا التَّوَسُّلُ إلَى الْمَفْسَدَةِ لَكِنَّهَا مُفْضِيَةٌ إلَيْهَا غَالِبًا وَمَفْسَدَتُهَا أَرْجَحُ مِنْ مَصْلَحَتِهَا.

الرَّابِعُ: وَسِيلَةٌ مَوْضُوعَةٌ لِلْمُبَاحِ وَقَدْ تُفْضِي إلَى الْمَفْسَدَةِ وَمَصْلَحَتُهَا أَرْجَحُ مِنْ مَفْسَدَتِهَا.

فَمِثَالُ الْقِسْمِ الْأَوَّلِ وَالثَّانِي قَدْ تَقَدَّمَ.

وَمِثَالُ الثَّالِثِ: الصَّلَاةُ فِي أَوْقَاتِ النَّهْيِ، وَمَسَبَّةُ آلِهَةِ الْمُشْرِكِينَ بَيْنَ ظَهْرَانِيهِمْ، وَتَزَيُّنُ الْمُتَوَفَّى عَنْهَا فِي زَمَنِ عِدَّتِهَا، وَأَمْثَالُ ذَلِكَ.
وَمِثَالُ الرَّابِعِ: النَّظَرُ إلَى الْمَخْطُوبَةِ، وَالْمُسْتَامَةِ، وَالْمَشْهُودِ عَلَيْهَا، وَمَنْ يَطَؤُهَا وَيُعَامِلُهَا، وَفِعْلُ ذَوَاتِ الْأَسْبَابِ فِي أَوْقَاتِ النَّهْيِ، وَكَلِمَةُ الْحَقِّ عِنْدَ ذِي سُلْطَانٍ جَائِرٍ، وَنَحْوُ ذَلِكَ؛ فَالشَّرِيعَةُ جَاءَتْ بِإِبَاحَةِ هَذَا الْقِسْمِ، أَوْ اسْتِحْبَابِهِ، أَوْ إيجَابِهِ بِحَسَبِ دَرَجَاتِهِ فِي الْمَصْلَحَةِ، وَجَاءَتْ بِالْمَنْعِ مِنْ الْقِسْمِ الْأَوَّلِ كَرَاهَةً أَوْ تَحْرِيمًا بِحَسَبِ دَرَجَاتِهِ فِي الْمَفْسَدَةِ، بَقِيَ النَّظَرُ فِي الْقِسْمَيْنِ الْوَسَطِ: هَلْ هُمَا مِمَّا جَاءَتْ الشَّرِيعَةُ بِإِبَاحَتِهِمَا أَوْ الْمَنْعِ مِنْهُمَا؟

فَنَقُولُ:

الدَّلَالَةُ عَلَى الْمَنْعِ مِنْ وُجُوهٍ:

الْوَجْهُ الْأَوَّلُ: قَوْله تَعَالَى: {وَلَا تَسُبُّوا الَّذِينَ يَدْعُونَ مِنْ دُونِ اللَّهِ فَيَسُبُّوا اللَّهَ عَدْوًا بِغَيْرِ عِلْمٍ}؛ فَحَرَّمَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى سَبَّ آلِهَةِ الْمُشْرِكِينَ -مَعَ كَوْنِ السَّبِّ غَيْظًا وَحَمِيَّةً لِلَّهِ وَإِهَانَةً لِآلِهَتِهِمْ- لِكَوْنِهِ ذَرِيعَةً إلَى سَبِّهِمْ اللَّهَ تَعَالَى، وَكَانَتْ مَصْلَحَةُ تَرْكِ مَسَبَّتِهِ تَعَالَى أَرْجَحَ مِنْ مَصْلَحَةِ سَبِّنَا لِآلِهَتِهِمْ، وَهَذَا كَالتَّنْبِيهِ بَلْ كَالتَّصْرِيحِ عَلَى الْمَنْعِ مِنْ الْجَائِزِ؛ لِئَلَّا يَكُونَ سَبَبًا فِي فِعْلِ مَا لَا يَجُوزُ.

الْوَجْهُ الثَّانِي: قَوْله تَعَالَى: {وَلَا يَضْرِبْنَ بِأَرْجُلِهِنَّ لِيُعْلَمَ مَا يُخْفِينَ مِنْ زِينَتِهِنَّ}، فَمَنَعَهُنَّ مِنْ الضَّرْبِ بِالْأَرْجُلِ وَإِنْ كَانَ جَائِزًا فِي نَفْسِهِ؛ لِئَلَّا يَكُونَ سَبَبًا إلَى سَمْعِ الرِّجَالِ صَوْتَ الْخَلْخَالِ؛ فَيُثِيرُ ذَلِكَ دَوَاعِيَ الشَّهْوَةِ مِنْهُمْ إلَيْهِنَّ.

الْوَجْهُ الثَّالِثُ: قَوْله تَعَالَى: {يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا لِيَسْتَأْذِنكُمْ الَّذِينَ مَلَكَتْ أَيْمَانُكُمْ وَاَلَّذِينَ لَمْ يَبْلُغُوا الْحُلُمَ مِنْكُمْ ثَلَاثَ مَرَّاتٍ} الْآيَةَ - أَمَرَ تَعَالَى مَمَالِيكَ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ وَمَنْ لَمْ يَبْلُغْ مِنْهُمْ الْحُلُمَ أَنْ يَسْتَأْذِنُوا عَلَيْهِمْ فِي هَذِهِ الْأَوْقَاتِ الثَّلَاثَةِ؛ لِئَلَّا يَكُونَ دُخُولُهُمْ هَجْمًا بِغَيْرِ اسْتِئْذَانٍ فِيهَا ذَرِيعَةٌ إلَى اطِّلَاعِهِمْ عَلَى عَوْرَاتِهِمْ وَقْتَ إلْقَاءِ ثِيَابِهِمْ عِنْدَ الْقَائِلَةِ وَالنَّوْمِ وَالْيَقِظَةِ، وَلَمْ يَأْمُرْهُمْ بِالِاسْتِئْذَانِ فِي غَيْرِهَا، وَإِنْ أَمْكَنَ فِي تَرْكِهِ هَذِهِ الْمَفْسَدَةِ لِنُدُورِهَا وَقِلَّةِ الْإِفْضَاءِ إلَيْهَا فَجُعِلَتْ كَالْمُقَدَّمَةِ.

الْوَجْهُ الرَّابِعُ: {يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا لَا تَقُولُوا رَاعِنَا وَقُولُوا اُنْظُرْنَا} نَهَاهُمْ سُبْحَانَهُ أَنْ يَقُولُوا هَذِهِ الْكَلِمَةَ -مَعَ قَصْدِهِمْ بِهَا الْخَيْرَ-؛ لِئَلَّا يَكُونَ قَوْلُهُمْ ذَرِيعَةً إلَى التَّشَبُّهِ بِالْيَهُودِ فِي أَقْوَالِهِمْ وَخِطَابِهِمْ؛ فَإِنَّهُمْ كَانُوا يُخَاطِبُونَ بِهَا النَّبِيَّ -صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ- وَيَقْصِدُونَ بِهَا السَّبَّ، وَيَقْصِدُونَ فَاعِلًا مِنْ الرُّعُونَةِ؛ فَنَهَى الْمُسْلِمُونَ عَنْ قَوْلِهَا؛ سَدًّا لِذَرِيعَةِ الْمُشَابَهَةِ، وَلِئَلَّا يَكُونَ ذَلِكَ ذَرِيعَةً إلَى أَنْ يَقُولَهَا الْيَهُودُ لِلنَّبِيِّ -صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ- تَشَبُّهًا بِالْمُسْلِمِينَ يَقْصِدُونَ بِهَا غَيْرَ مَا يَقْصِدُهُ الْمُسْلِمُونَ.

الْوَجْهُ الْخَامِسُ: قَوْله تَعَالَى لِكَلِيمِهِ مُوسَى وَأَخِيهِ هَارُونَ: {اذْهَبَا إلَى فِرْعَوْنَ إنَّهُ طَغَى فَقُولَا لَهُ قَوْلًا لَيِّنًا لَعَلَّهُ يَتَذَكَّرُ أَوْ يَخْشَى} فَأَمَرَ تَعَالَى أَنْ يُلِينَا الْقَوْلَ لِأَعْظَمِ أَعْدَائِهِ، وَأَشَدِّهِمْ كُفْرًا، وَأَعْتَاهُمْ عَلَيْهِ؛ لِئَلَّا يَكُونَ إغْلَاظُ الْقَوْلِ لَهُ مَعَ أَنَّهُ حَقِيقٌ بِهِ ذَرِيعَةً إلَى تَنْفِيرِهِ وَعَدَمِ صَبْرِهِ لِقِيَامِ الْحُجَّةِ، فَنَهَاهُمَا عَنْ الْجَائِزِ؛ لِئَلَّا يَتَرَتَّبَ عَلَيْهِ مَا هُوَ أَكْرَهُ إلَيْهِ تَعَالَى.

الْوَجْه السَّادِسُ: أَنَّهُ تَعَالَى نَهَى الْمُؤْمِنِينَ فِي مَكَّةَ عَنْ الِانْتِصَارِ بِالْيَدِ، وَأَمَرَهُمْ بِالْعَفْوِ وَالصَّفْحِ؛ لِئَلَّا يَكُونَ انْتِصَارُهُمْ ذَرِيعَةً إلَى وُقُوعِ مَا هُوَ أَعْظَمُ مَفْسَدَةً مِنْ مَفْسَدَةِ الْإِغْضَاءِ وَاحْتِمَالِ الضَّيْمِ، وَمَصْلَحَةُ حِفْظِ نُفُوسِهِمْ وَدِينِهِمْ وَذُرِّيَّتِهِمْ رَاجِحَةٌ عَلَى مَصْلَحَةِ الِانْتِصَارِ وَالْمُقَابَلَةِ.

الْوَجْهُ السَّابِعُ: أَنَّهُ تَعَالَى نَهَى عَنْ الْبَيْعِ وَقْتَ نِدَاءِ الْجُمُعَةِ؛ لِئَلَّا يُتَّخَذَ ذَرِيعَةً إلَى التَّشَاغُلِ بِالتِّجَارَةِ عَنْ حُضُورِهَا» اهـ.

... وتابع فذكر تسعاً وتسعين وجهاً يدل على سد الذرائع (أعلام الموقعين 3/135- 159)).

Thursday, 7 January 2021

متى يسقط وجوب إنكار المنكر عند العز بن عبدالسلام؟

الحمد لله وحده والصلاة والسلام على من لا نبي بعده.

أما بعد, فإن العز بن عبد السلام رحمه الله فقيه عٌرف بشجاعته وشدة إنكاره على بعض حكام عصره مع ما أُخِذ عليه من اعتناق عقيدة المتكلمين والدفاع عنها, وتأليب بعض الحكام على من خالف عقيدته في زمنه!.

وبسبب شجاعته في إنكار منكرِ بعض حكام زمانه في قصص ذكرها أهل التراجم؛ صار يًشبَّه به كل من يحسب أنه يتكلم بالحق ولا يخشى في ذلك أحدا, وتوسع الناس في ذلك؛ حتى وقع بعضهم في الظلم وتعدي الحق.

ولذا أردت أن أبين قواعد سار عليها في إنكار المنكر؛ ليتضح للقارئ الكريم أن الشجاعة في الحق وعدم الخوف من السلاطين وغيرهم محكوم بمقاصد الشريعة وكلياتها ونصوصها الجزئية؛ فإطلاق العنان لإنكار المنكر من غير اعتبار مقاصد الشرع ومراعاة حال العبد, وكذا الطعن مطلقا فيمن لم ينكر: من المنكر الذي ينكره العز بن عبد السلام, وإن كان العز رحمه الله يرى أن المخاطرة بالنفس في سبيل إعزاز الدين مندوب إليها, كما قال في قواعد الأحكام في مصالح الأنام (1/ 94): (التقرير على المعاصي كلها مفسدة لكن يجوز التقرير عليها عند العجز عن إنكارها باليد واللسان، ومن قدر على إنكارها مع الخوف على نفسه كان إنكاره مندوبا إليه ومحثوثا عليه، لأن المخاطرة بالنفوس في إعزاز الدين مأمور بها) 
.
وقد ظن بعضهم أن من لم يقل قولة الحق في كل مكان ومع كل أحد- إن سلم أن ما يعتقده هذا القائل حقا- فهو خائن جبان على هوى السلطان...!!

وفي ضوء هذا الانبهار بمثل هذه الادعاءات وتزييف الحقائق وتغييرها كان لابد من ذكر أمور لها تأثير عظيم بمسألة المجاهرة بالإنكار:

ومن هذه الأمور التي كان يراعيها العز رحمه الله ويرتب الأحكام عليها: الخوف على النفس, فمتى كان المنكِر خائفا على نفسه فإنه يسقط عنه الإنكار باليد واللسان, وفي هذا رد على من ينفي الشجاعة وقول الحق عن عالم سكت عن الإنكار؛ خوفا على نفسه, قال العز في شجرة المعارف: (...فإن قدر على إزالته بنفسه لزمه ذلك إلا أن يخاف على نفسه فسقط الوجوب وانتفى الاستحباب) 
وكذا كان يراعي العجز, فيجعله عذرا لترك الإنكار على الحاكم, فقال في شجرة المعارف (214) عن الحاكم الجائر: (وإذا كرهت أعماله وعجزت عن إنكارها فأنت مأجور على كراهيتها؛ إجلالا لله تعالى وتعظيما لأمره)

كما كان يراعي أيضا حال الإكراه ويرى وجوب طاعة المكره؛ لدفع مفسدة أكبر, فقال في قواعد الأحكام في مصالح الأنام (2/ 134): (فمن أمر بمعصية فلا سمع ولا طاعة له، إلا أن يكره إنسانا على أمر يبيحه الإكراه فلا إثم على مطيعه، وقد تجب طاعته لا لكونه آمرا بل لدفع مفسدة ما يهدده به من قتل أو قطع أو جناية على بضع)
وهذا كله يدور في فلك حفظ النفس, فمصلحة حفظ النفس أعظم من مصلحة الإنكار هنا, ولذا جاز ترك الإنكار.

وإذا جاز الأخذ بالرخص؛ دفعا للمشقة, كما قال العز في قواعد الأحكام في مصالح الأنام (1/ 51): (وفي الرخص تترك المصالح الراجحة إلى المصالح المرجوحة للعذر دفعا للمشاق) وقال (1/ 52): (والحاصل أن الشرع يجعل المصلحة المرجوحة عند تعذر الوصول إلى الراجحة أو عند مشقة الوصول إلى الراجحة، بدلا من المصلحة الراجحة)
فما فوقها من باب أولى.

والعلماء ليسوا على درجة واحدة, فمقام أحمد بن حنبل ليس كمقام يحيى بن معين وعلي بن المدينى, ولذا صبر أحمد وصار إمام أهل السنة وأجاب في الفتنة يحيى وعلي رحمهم الله جميعا وهم أئمة يرجع إليهم ويؤخذ منهم.

لكن لا يعني ذلك تبرير الباطل وتسويغه بلا موجب شرعي كالإكراه.

كتبه أحمد محمد الصادق النجار

Wednesday, 6 January 2021

The Pandemic Disproved Urban Progressives’ Theory About Gentrification

The “gentrification-industrial complex” isn’t who anti-growth progressives think it is.

From California to the Northeast, a funny thing has happened recently in America’s most expensive metropolitan areas: Rents have gone down. Ever since remote workers began fleeing urban cores at the start of the coronavirus pandemic—whether to the Hamptons or their parents’ basements—urban housing markets have been flooded with empty apartments. As a result, the prices that rental units command in certain large cities have dropped dramatically, to the tune of 18 percent in Boston, 19 percent in Seattle, and nearly 25 percent in San Francisco, according to a November survey by the firm Apartment List.

The cause of the drop should hardly be surprising. The pandemic has radically decreased demand for big-city living while also increasing the quantity of available apartments. Yet this basic fact, plain for all to see, flies in the face of much received wisdom about the factors that cause urban housing prices to go up or down. Among some leftists and liberals alike, as well as the politicians who court them, the idea that developers of pricey apartments and condo buildings are to blame for high housing prices has long been an article of faith. In this telling, new luxury housing is the reason that former working- and middle-class neighborhoods in their cities have become fancy enclaves. (“You know exactly what a gentrification building looks like,” read a recent viral tweet.) Fighting the construction of such housing would not only reverse the trend of unaffordability, but from the perspective of politicians and activists would also demonstrate support for working-class residents in the process. Since the spring, the pandemic has prompted a steady flow of stories about how urban life will change forever. But COVID-19’s most lasting impact on cities might be in helping put to rest this most persistent of myths about the relationship between housing supply, the cost of living, and that four-letter word of urban politics: gentrification. Not only is it a simplistic analysis that absolves nearly anyone who isn’t a developer of responsibility for the problem, but in portraying new housing as the proximate cause of gentrification, it exacerbates the very housing crisis it seeks to solve.

Choose any major city in America with a high cost of living, and you’ll find that the suspicion of new housing is pervasive in local politics. On a sunny day in early September 2020, for example, Scott Stringer, New York City’s comptroller, stood at a lectern in a park in Upper Manhattan and launched his campaign for mayor. As an elected official of 27 years, he has telegraphed his desire to hold the city’s highest post for some time. But Stringer’s speech was notable for the way in which he positioned his campaign: not as the safe mainstream choice, as one might assume for a politician with his credentials, but as a revolution of the people against the powerful. Nowhere was this framing clearer than in his description of how he would change the trajectory of real-estate development in the city. A Stringer administration, he said, would mean “no more giving away the store to developers” and “an end to the gentrification-industrial complex.”

The New York mayoral race will be one of 2021’s most prominent elections, which makes Stringer’s campaign an interesting case study of some key trends happening within the progressive movement in cities. For one, it is evidence that politicians in deep-blue urban areas sense an unmet demand for the sort of unabashedly left-wing politics whose revival at the federal level began with Bernie Sanders’s unexpectedly strong primary challenge to Hillary Clinton in 2016. More importantly, however, it shows that left-wing candidates in local elections believe that they must take a strong stand against gentrification as a way of demonstrating their progressive bona fides. Stringer is not alone in this regard. One of his opponents, the Brooklyn borough president Eric Adams, made headlines last January for suggesting that gentrifiers should “go back to Iowa,” while another candidate, City Councilor Carlos Menchaca, decried “the wealthy developers who rezone our neighborhoods” in his campaign’s launch video. In Boston, which will also hold a mayoral election this year, City Councilor Michelle Wu has sought to distinguish herself on the question of housing growth as well. As chair of the city council’s planning committee, Wu has called for more community oversight of the city’s Zoning Board of Appeal and for the elimination of the Boston Planning and Development Agency, both of which she has characterized as out of touch and overly permissive in granting exemptions from the city’s zoning laws under the current mayor, Marty Walsh.

Gentrification is a notoriously slippery term, and the popular appeal of any attempt to address it depends largely on how one defines it. By focusing on supposedly unrestrained growth as its root cause, new progressive campaigns have revived a decades-old political coalition of renters, homeowners, and other interest groups whose origins lie in a different era of these cities’ histories. This unusually broad and largely inadvertent partnership was influential in bringing an end to the era of urban renewal, and it has the potential to be a potent force in urban politics for years to come. Yet this anti-growth partnership presumes that the interests of the landed and the landless are aligned—that a policy of more tightly regulated development can both generate wealth for those who own property and redistribute it to those who don’t. In the 21st century, when halting the rise of rents and property values in many large cities has taken a global pandemic, the logic that undergirds this movement deserves a critical look.

Skepticism about growth has been a powerful force in urban politics for more than half a century. Around 1960, groups across several American cities began questioning the political economy that seemed to produce constant development and redevelopment projects, which the sociologists John Logan and Harvey Molotch memorably characterized as a “growth machine.” Then, as today, the slow-growthers and no-growthers were an idiosyncratic bunch. Conservationists, worried about the effect of metropolitan expansion on scenic rural areas, organized for new laws protecting “open space” and establishing environmental-review procedures for major development projects. Architectural preservationists, who preferred ornate older buildings to modernist designs and saw their work as integral to keeping urban living appealing, worked to designate some of American cities’ first historic districts. Homeowner groups mobilized against highways, commercial establishments, multi-family apartment buildings, and other nuisances that they perceived as threats to their property values and “neighborhood character.” And left-wing organizations constituting what the activist Harry Boyte later called the “backyard revolution”—a movement that emphasized small-scale community organizing and other place-based advocacy as a means of effecting social justice—participated as well, calling for processes that would allow vulnerable groups, such as tenants, to veto new projects they did not feel were in their best interest.

Observers of what came to be known as a growth revolt noted the way that its participants seemed to defy traditional partisan alignments and, through local development, battles were helping to create, inadvertently or otherwise, a new national growth policy. “Clearly the new mood is not based on any particular political ideology,” wrote Fred P. Bosselman, a prominent land-use attorney, in the journal Planning in 1973. “At a local zoning hearing you might find on one side an elderly dowager who’s voted straight Republican since McKinley and her granddaughter from a commune where they live on nuts and berries. Both are seeking to stop new development.” The unusual politics of growth arose out of a particular set of circumstances that existed in cities at the time. The immediate postwar years were an era of tremendous physical and social instability in major urban areas. In older cities in the northern half of the U.S., some entire communities seemed to be packing up and leaving for the suburbs or the Sun Belt, where new neighborhoods sprang up virtually overnight. Thanks in part to generous federal initiatives, pro-growth state and local politicians in expanding and shrinking cities alike competed for tax dollars by building major infrastructure and redevelopment projects. Neighborhoods of color frequently bore the brunt of these schemes, prompting James Baldwin’s famous observation that “urban renewal means Negro removal.”

Whether in stagnant northern cities or in the booming Sun Belt, a wide array of groups thus had ample reason to oppose urban development. Throughout the 1970s and ’80s, through the implementation of height limits, density restrictions, design review boards, mandatory community input, and other veto points in the development process, they achieved more victories than many of the initial participants thought possible. The broad-based nature of the anti-growth coalition was key to its success. Nature enthusiasts, architectural historians, homeowners, and rock-ribbed socialists all found it advantageous to portray developers as a shadowy, parasitic force in metropolitan politics. Politicians, for their part, were more than willing to position themselves as defenders of this broad array of neighborhood groups and their values. But the composition of the coalition also limited the scope of its activism. In particular, the centrality of homeowners within the anti-growth alliance meant that maintaining the stability of property values would always guide the direction of the movement overall. In the 1960s and ’70s, when renting in cities was relatively affordable and owning a house was often not especially profitable, this dynamic posed no obvious problem. Environmentalists believed that they could seek to save their conservation areas, preservationists their historic districts, leftists their tenant protections, and homeowners their exclusive neighborhoods, all apparently without harming one another’s interests.

These now-half-century-old arguments have had remarkable staying power well into a different era of urban history, one in which gentrification, rather than renewal, is the hot-button issue. Despite this shift, many still insist that neighborhood change remains inextricably linked to development. As Stringer’s reference to a “gentrification-industrial complex” indicates, critics have come to portray high-end shopping and glassy condos not as lagging indicators of local demographic change but as the causes thereof. The battle lines are drawn in the form of fights over discrete construction projects. Every politician wants to be seen as the second coming of Jane Jacobs, taking to the streets to block the bulldozers and save the soul of the neighborhood.

But if gentrification is defined as a demographic transition toward wealthier, whiter residents, this approach makes for a poor policy response. This is because the forces that drive this kind of neighborhood change do not come from the construction of specific apartment buildings or retail complexes, no matter how many granite countertops or artisanal coffee shops they might contain. Instead, they result from a degree of demand for inner-city living that would have shocked the slow-growthers of the 1960s—demand that, for the most part, has been channeled not into new condos but into homes built before the first wave of anti-development activism. When white-collar firms began to re-concentrate downtown in the 1980s and ’90s, their workers, soon priced out of elite neighborhoods, bought old homes in marginal areas and modified them to their liking. The people they displaced crowded into poorer quarters of the city, or moved to lower-end suburbs, or, often, left for more affordable parts of the country altogether.

This process still predominates in coastal cities today as competition for housing has continued to push outward from the urban core. Thirty or 40 years ago, a lawyer or financier in New York who could not afford a rowhouse on the Upper West Side might have instead bought a home in Park Slope, displacing a few tenants to Prospect Heights. A decade or two later, a new generation of white-collar workers priced out of Park Slope moved to Prospect Heights, and renters left for Bedford-Stuyvesant or Bushwick. Today, the Bushwick property market is hot, and someone working a minimum-wage job might look for housing in Queens, or New Jersey, or Houston. The telltale sign of a neighborhood in transition isn’t a yoga studio or a high-rise apartment building. It is an old rowhouse, meticulously renovated and painted in the avant-garde yet inoffensive shade that Amanda Kolson Hurley memorably called “flip-house gray.”

The homeowner-friendly slow-growth activism that marked American cities in the late twentieth century is thus best understood not as the predecessor of today’s anti-gentrification politics but as the progenitor of the gentrification crisis itself. In wealthy coastal cities today, one need not develop skyscrapers or shopping malls to be a speculator in urban property. With widespread housing scarcity, simply owning a modest home in Berkeley or Brooklyn will suffice. In the 21st century, the division between the haves and the have-nots is no longer a matter of which side of the bulldozer one finds oneself on. Instead, it is a question of whether one belongs to the class that pays higher and higher rents with each passing year—or to the class that extracts them.

Tuesday, 5 January 2021

The Mythology of Karen

The meme is so powerful because of the awkward status of white women.

What does it mean to call a woman a “Karen”? The origins of any meme are hard to pin down, and this one has spread with the same intensity as the coronavirus, and often in parallel with it. Karens are “the policewomen of all human behavior.” Karens don’t believe in vaccines. Karens have short hair. Karens are selfish. Confusingly, Karens are both the kind of petty enforcers who patrol other people’s failures at social distancing, and the kind of entitled women who refuse to wear a mask because it’s a “muzzle.”

Oh, and Karens are most definitely white. Let that ease your conscience if you were beginning to wonder whether the meme was, perhaps, a little bit sexist in identifying various universal negative behaviors and attributing them exclusively to women. “Because Karen is white, she faces few meaningful repercussions,” wrote Robin Abcarian in the Los Angeles Times. “Embarrassing videos posted on social media is usually as bad as it gets for Karen.”

Sorry, but no. You can’t control a word, or an idea, once it’s been released into the wild. Epithets linked to women have a habit of becoming sexist insults; we don’t tend to describe men as bossy, ditzy, or nasty. They’re not called mean girls or prima donnas or drama queens, even when they totally are. And so Karen has followed the trajectory of dozens of words before it, becoming a cloak for casual sexism as well as a method of criticizing the perceived faux vulnerability of white women.

To understand why the Karen debate has been so fierce and emotive, you need to understand the two separate (and opposing) traditions on which it draws: anti-racism and sexism. You also need to understand the challenge that white women as a group pose to modern activist culture. When so many online debates involve mentally awarding “privilege points” to each side of an encounter or argument to adjudicate who holds the most power, the confusing status of white women jams the signal. Are they the oppressors or the oppressed? Worse than that, what if they are using their apparent disadvantage—being a woman—as a weapon?

One phrase above all has come to encapsulate the essence of a Karen: She is the kind of woman who asks to speak to the manager. In doing so, Karen is causing trouble for others. It is taken as read that her complaint is bogus, or at least disproportionate to the vigor with which she pursues it. The target of Karen’s entitled anger is typically presumed to be a racial minority or a working-class person, and so she is executing a covert maneuver: using her white femininity to present herself as a victim, when she is really the aggressor.

Call Donald Trump “the ultimate Karen” if you like, but the word’s power—its punch—comes from the frequently fraught cultural space white women in the United States have occupied for generations. This includes the schism between white suffragists and the abolitionist movement, where prominent white women expressed affronted rage that Black men might be granted the vote ahead of them. “If intelligence, justice and morality are to have precedence in the government, let the question of women be brought up first and that of the negro last,” declared Susan B. Anthony in 1869 at a conference of the American Equal Rights Association. (She was responding to the suggestion by Frederick Douglass that Black male enfranchisement was a more urgent issue than women’s suffrage.) There are also echoes in the Scottsboro Boys case, where eight Black men were wrongly convicted of raping two white women in 1930s Alabama; and the rape of the “Central Park jogger,” where the horrifying violence suffered by a white woman was the pretext for the state’s persecution of innocent men.

The tension is even more obvious in another infamous case. In August 1955, Carolyn Bryant Donham was 21 years old, and working in a store she owned with her husband, Roy Bryant, in the Mississippi Delta. A Black teenage boy walked into the store, and then—well, no one knows, exactly. Bryant Donham’s initial story was that he wolf-whistled at her. In court, later, she said he grabbed her, insulted her, and told her he’d been with white women before. Decades later, she said that she had made it all up, and couldn’t remember exactly what had happened.

None of that made any difference to the boy, who was hunted down by Roy Bryant and killed. His body was found days later, so mutilated that his mother insisted on an open-casket funeral, which would force the world to witness what had been done to him. His name was Emmett Till.

That story is vital to understanding America’s Karen mythology. A white woman’s complaint led white male authority to enact violence on a Black person, and neither she nor they suffered any consequences. Roy Bryant and his half brother were put on trial for Till’s murder, but acquitted by an all-white, all-male jury. Within a racist, patriarchal system, Bryant Donham’s fragility—her white femininity—was not a weakness, but a weapon, because she could always call on white men to protect her. (Yet even that case is more morally complex than it once seemed. In 2017, the Duke University professor Timothy B. Tyson, who was researching a book on the case, discovered that Roy Bryant was physically abusive to his wife. “The circumstances under which she told the story were coercive,” he told The New York Times. “She’s horrified by it. There’s clearly a great burden of guilt and sorrow.”)

All of this is why the earnest feminist contribution to the Karen debate—why isn’t there a name for haughty, shouty men who make customer-service complaints, or call the police on Black people, putting them in danger?—is irrelevant. There doesn’t need to be a word for that, because the concept being invoked here is the faux victim. Although they differ vastly in magnitude, a direct line of descent can be traced from the Till case to the “Central Park Karen,” a white woman named Amy Cooper who called the New York City police earlier this year claiming that a Black male bird-watcher was threatening her. (Cooper lost her job and is facing criminal charges for filing a false report.) A white woman’s tears were, again, a weapon to unleash the authorities—still coded white and male, despite the advances we have made since the 1950s—upon a Black man.

The potency of the Karen mythology is yet more proof that the internet “speaks American.” Here in Britain, there is no direct equivalent of the Till case, and voting rights were never restricted on racial lines. The big splits in the British suffrage movement were between violent and nonviolent tactics, and on whether men under 30 should receive the vote before women. Yet British newspapers have rushed to explain the Karen meme to their readers, because Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram—the prime sites for Karen-spotting—are widely used in this country. (In fact, the Karen discussion has spread throughout the English-speaking internet, reaching as far as New Zealand.)

At some point, though, the particular American history behind Karen got lost. What started as an indictment of racial privilege has become divorced from its original context, and is now a catchall term for shaming women online.

Not very much unites the rapper Ice T and the “alt-right” activist Paul Joseph Watson of InfoWars, but both can agree on this: Karens are a menace. In July, Ice T identified a “Karen of the Day,” tweeting a video of a woman who refused to wear a mask in a dentist’s office. It was another instance of the meme’s suspicious flexibility: Is a Karen a woman flouting the rules or pettily enforcing them? (Never mind the fact that research shows men are less likely to wear masks, anyway.)

Watson’s take was even more revealing, because he was not playing to an audience that considers itself progressive. That means he can say the quiet part out loud. In one YouTube video with nearly 1 million views, Watson defines a “Karen” as “an annoying, interfering female adult, who complains about everything.” The first clip in his compilation is of a man cycling past a woman, who tells the cyclist briskly but not angrily: “That’s not social distancing.”

Cut to Watson: “Okay, Karen.”

Cut back to the man on the bike, incredulous at being challenged. “Stupid bitch, shut up.”

This is the hazard of memes, as well as the phenomenon of viral shaming more broadly. There’s no arbiter to decide which Karens are really acting in egregious or racist ways before the millionth like or view is reached, or their names are publicly revealed. Karen has become synonymous with woman among those who consider woman an insult. There is now a market, measured in attention and approbation, for anyone who can sniff out a Karen.

Whenever the potential sexism of the Karen meme has been raised, the standard reply has been that it originated in Black women’s critiques of racism, that white women have more privilege than Black women, and that therefore identifying and chastising Karens is a form of “punching up.” In February, Aja Romano of Voxdefined Karens as “officious white women ruining the party for everyone else,” adding that “Black culture in particular has a history of assigning basic nicknames to badly behaved white women … [from] Barbecue Becky and Golfcart Gail to Permit Patty and Talkback Tammy.” Calling the Karen meme sexist, according to TheWashington Post’s Karen Attiah, “only trivializes actual violence and discrimination that destroy lives and communities. And to invent oppression when none is happening to you? … That is peak Karen behavior.”

The best way to see the Karen meme is as a “scissor,” an idea popularized by the writer Scott Alexander of Slate Star Codex to describe an incident or a statement that drives people to such wildly divergent interpretations that they can never be reconciled. Because white women can be both oppressors and oppressed, Karen is a scissor. Does the word describe a particular type of behavior that resonates because of the particular racial history of the United States? Yes. Is that the only way it is used? No.

As it happens, the casually sexist roots of the meme are as deep as the anti-racist ones. One of the foundational internet Karens was the ex-wife of a Redditor who chronicled their fraught relationship in the subreddit r/FuckYouKaren, created in December 2017. The intensity of the blowback when pointing facts like this out is itself instructive. The chorus of disdain that greets any white woman who questionsthe Karen meme comes from a broad, and unexpected, coalition: anti-racists andbog-standard misogynists. (Finally, a political stance to bring this troubled world together.)

For the same reason, the Karen meme divides white women themselves. On one side are those who register its sexist uses, who feel the familiar tang of misogyny. Women are too loud, too demanding, too entitled. Others push aside those echoes, reasoning that if Black women want a word to describe their experience of racism, they should be allowed to have it. Hanging over white women’s decision on which way to jump is a classic finger trap, familiar to anyone who has confronted a sexist joke, only to be told that they don’t have a sense of humor. What is more Karen than complaining about being called “Karen”? There is a strong incentive to be cool about other women being Karened, lest you be Karened yourself.

In her 1991 essay “From Practice to Theory, or What is a White Woman Anyway?” the feminist and legal scholar Catharine MacKinnon referenced the Till case to explain the malignant stereotype that has grown up around the “white woman” in the United States. “This creature is not poor, not battered, not raped (not really), not molested as a child, not pregnant as a teenager, not prostituted, not coerced into pornography, not a welfare mother, and not economically exploited,” wrote MacKinnon. “She is Miss Anne of the kitchen, she puts Frederick Douglass to the lash, she cries rape when Emmett Till looks at her sideways, she manipulates white men’s very real power with the lifting of her very well-manicured little finger.” She might have added, echoing the LA Times: Nothing worse happens to the white woman than a viral-video shaming.

MacKinnon’s point was that sexism existed, and even whiteness did not protect women from suffering it. (A response to MacKinnon by the Yale Collective on Women of Color and the Law contested some of her points, but agreed that feminism had to address the “very real oppression suffered by women, despite any access women may have to social privilege.”) Call the Karen meme sexist, though, and you will stumble into the middle of a Venn diagram, where progressive activists and anti-feminists can agree with each other: When white women say they’ve been raped, we should doubt them, because we know white women lie. And underneath that: What do white women have to complain about, anyway?

Ageism is also a factor. As a name, Karen peaked in the U.S. in the 1960s, and is now rare for newborns, so today’s Karen is likely to be well into middle age. As women shout and rant and protest in out-of-context clips designed to paint them in the most viral-friendly light possible, they are portrayed as witches, harridans, harpies: women who dare to keep existing, speaking, and asking to see the manager, after their reproductive peak.

In her essay, MacKinnon wrote that it was hard for women to organize “as women.” Many of us, she wrote, are more comfortable organizing around identities we share with men, such as gay rights or civil rights. “I sense here that people feel more dignity in being part of any group that includes men than in being part of a group that includes that ultimate reduction of the notion of oppression, that instigator of lynch mobs, that ludicrous whiner, that equality coattails rider, the white woman,” she added. “It seems that if your oppression is also done to a man, you are more likely to be recognized as oppressed as opposed to inferior.” That is the minefield that anyone who wants to use the Karen meme to “punch up” has to traverse. You will find yourself in unsavory company alongside those who see white women as ludicrous whiners.

In 2011, writing in The Atlantic, Ta-Nehisi Coates acknowledged the sexism that suffragists such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Sarah Grimké faced from fellow abolitionists, and their sense of being told again and again that women’s rights were important, sure, but not urgent. Coates does not acquit these white suffragists of racial entitlement, but adds: “When the goal—abolition—was achieved, they hoped for some reciprocity. It did not come.” Without excusing their lack of solidarity, he attempts to understand it. The Nineteenth Amendment, which gave women the vote, came nearly 50 years after the Fifteenth, which ruled that voting rights could not be restricted “on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”